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It is possible in principle to argue that philosophy and its method have no 
progress. For example, you might characterize philosophy “as a series of footnotes 
to Plato”1 and argue that there is no progress in philosophy since Ancient Greek 
thought. However, there is another position according to which there exists 
progress in philosophy and we can reach it by applying the existing method 
carefully or change the method to the more fruitful one. This thought is echoing T. 
Williamson’s statement from Philosophy of Philosophy (2007:7):  
[S]mall improvements in accepted standards of reasoning may enable the philosophical 
community to reach knowledgeable agreement on the status of many more arguments. 
Development of tools we can use in our reasoning is one of the key missions 
of philosophy nowadays. If we are not satisfied with the formal methods we have, 
then we have to improve them. In this way, one can view my thesis as an 
improvement of the existing formal methodology of dealing with expressions 
containing indexicals.  
Indexicals are expressions whose meaning depends on the context. In the 
context of this thesis an indexical ‘I’ denotes me, the author of the thesis and 
another indexical ‘you’ denotes a reader of it. Indexicals like ‘now’ or ‘here’ require 
even more context. If I write ‘It is dark here now’ then in order to understand what 
I communicated you need to know that I am in my room in Tartu and that it is 11 
p.m. on the 4th of August 2020. The context helps us to find out that I wrote the 
truth. In that way, the meaning of indexicals is connected with the context. When 
we talk with each other we always do it in some context. Thus, we use tons of 
indexicals every day, and that makes a topic of indexicals so important. All the 
following examples illustrate it (indexicals are the words in the single quotation 
marks): We refer to ourselves and our addressees using ‘I’ and ‘You’. We recall 
something that was ‘yesterday’ and dream about ‘tomorrow’. We ask a seller to give 
us ‘this’ apple and don’t want to go to ‘that’ overpriced bar again.        
 
1  Whitehead, A. (1979) Process and Reality, p.39 
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In the philosophy of language, David Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives 
(hereafter just LD) is widely regarded as the best formal approach to the indexicals. 
In the first section of my thesis, I will be describing the main idea(s) that can be 
found within Kaplan’s LD. The key feature of this system is that it is two-
dimensional i.e. there are two worlds with respect to which a given sentence is 
evaluated. The first dimension is the context and the second is the circumstances 
of evaluation.  
In the second section, I will discuss some of the difficulties that occur for the 
formal apparatus within LD when the epistemic operator K (‘it is known that’) is 
added. I present several surprising conclusions that result from adding K using 
LD’s standard semantics. This leads us to the problem I am trying to solve: Is it 
possible to add K to LD without doing violence to the standard informal 
interpretation of K? If yes, then how?  
If the standard semantics for K is of no help for us, then we need to replace 
it with an adequate one. In the third section, I examine one possible solution.  It is 
to make use of an interpretation presented in the article written by Rabinowicz and 
Segerberg (1994). In it, they gave a two-dimensional approach to the epistemic 
operator and introduced an “E-relation” that was originally intended to avoid 
Fitch’s paradox. While not its original or intended use, this E-relation can be made 
to be relevant to the current discussion of the issues LD has with K. From here, I 
argue that the modification of Rabinowicz and Sererberg’s is plausible. This 
solution allows us to stay within the same two-dimensional framework found in 
LD and avoids the problems posted in section two. Therefore, I conclude that we 
should expand LD with K using Rabinowicz and Segerberg’s approach.  
Introducing the knowledge operator to LD may allow us to deal with more 
truths and probably to get some other theoretically interesting conclusions. It will 
let us proceed to sentences like ‘It is known that I am here now’. It is quite natural 
to ask the next question: Known for whom? This leads us to the question of the 
epistemic agent a and to the more complex epistemic operator Ka (‘it is known for 
an agent a that’). The thesis makes the first step towards such an operator. 
Consequently, it may become the base for some further research. For now, I am 
6 
 
only focusing on the technical details how the epistemic operator might be 
introduced to the LD.  
Preliminary remarks 
To start off, it is important for the reader to be on the same page as myself. 
This thesis crucially deals with context-sensitive elements and, thus, it is useful to 
assume a shared context for the reader and me. We will do this by assuming that 
we are in Tartu, at noon on the 13th of July, and that ‘I’ uniquely denotes Nikolai 
Shurakov. 
Secondly, I will assume that we understand the meaning of words such as 
‘now’ and ‘here’. We do not need to speculate about this but I do not deny that 
there is a giant room for such speculations in metaphysics. I suggest to take these 
words as follows: ‘now’ refers to a minute time period and ‘here’ refers to at least 
one square meter sized piece of space. These assumptions do not directly affect my 
argument and are needed only for better representation of my ideas. 
Thirdly, there is a conflict in the notation used by the different authors. My 
work is mainly based on the Demonstratives, so I chose to use ‘A’ for the actuality 
operator. Kaplan used it in this way and I follow him. However, in some papers 
that I will cite, the actuality operator is denoted using a symbol ‘@’. Throughout 
the thesis, I will stick with one style, hence I will substitute uses of ‘@’ to ‘A’ 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. Due to this, there may be occasions where 
my citation differs slightly from the original text but I prefer to be consistent and 







1. Logic of Demonstratives and motivations for it 
This expository section aims to acquaint a reader with LD. I will begin with 
an explanation of the motives for introducing LD. I will then, present the language 
and the main features found within this system. 
First off, I will go into more detail as to what indexicals are than what I 
provided in the introduction of this thesis. Crucially, indexicals are context-
sensitive expressions; that is, the meaning of indexicals vary from one context to 
another. If you and I say ‘I am the author of this thesis’ the indexical ‘I’ refers to 
me in one case and to you in another. This difference affects even the truth-value 
of an expressed proposition. In the former context, I would be telling the truth 
whereas in the latter you would be lying. The very same sentence that contains an 
indexical (or indexicals) expresses different propositions with respect to different 
contexts. In addition to ‘I’, Kaplan (1989:489) mentions other examples of 
indexicals such as the pronouns ‘my’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘his’, ‘she’, ‘it’, the demonstrative 
pronouns ‘that’ and ‘this’, the adverbs ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘yesterday’, 
along with the adjectives ‘actual’ and ‘present’.  
Kaplan (1989:490) calls some of them demonstratives. That’s the reason 
why his formal system called the Logic of Demonstratives. Demonstratives work 
differently from the other indexicals in that the meaning of such words is 
incomplete without an additional demonstration. For example, I could say to a 
waiter ‘I would like to have this bottle of wine’. In this example, the waiter would 
not be able to understand me if I wasn’t pointing to some bottle of wine. As this 
example illustrates ‘this’ is an example of a demonstrative. Throughout his work, 
Kaplan also singles out a group of indexicals that he calls pure indexicals. 
Examples of pure indexicals include: ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘here’, ‘tomorrow’ and others for 
which “no associated demonstration is required, and any demonstration supplied 
is either for emphasis or is irrelevant (Kaplan 1989:491)”. I will not argue that 
Kaplan’s list of indexicals is complete or that it is the only way to deal with 
indexicals. Rather, I am taking his way of thinking about and treating indexicals as 
a basic assumption that will define which words we should consider as indexicals 
for the purposes of this paper.  
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Let’s assume that we are talking about the actual world w in which I utter 
the following two sentences: 
(1) I am here now. 
(2) Nikolai Shurakov is in Tartu, at noon on the 13th of July. 
Before Kaplan, there was an approach to indexicals that stated that (1) 
expresses the same proposition as (2) when uttered in given circumstances. Kaplan 
(1979:81) considers this approach at the very beginning of his article: 
It has been thought by some - myself among others - that by analogy, the intension of 'I' 
could be represented by a function from speakers to individuals (in fact, the identity function). And 
similarly, that the intensions of 'here' and 'now' would be represented by (identity) functions on 
places and times.  
This view is called Index Theory and is discussed by Kaplan in section VII 
of Demonstratives. According to Index Theory, if we take some proper indices, 
such as a for an agent, p for a place, and t for a time, then we may find out that (1) 
is true when a=Nikolai Shurakov, p=Tartu, and t=noon of the 13th of July. If so, 
(1) is saying precisely the same as (2). Hence, both sentences are two ways of 
expressing one and the same proposition. However, there are many quadruples of 
the world, agent place and time (a set ⟨w, a, p, t⟩) such that a sentence constructed 
using the following schema ‘[at w] Agent a is in place p at time t’ is false. For 
example, one such false quadruple would be: the actual world, Nikolai, Darovskoy, 
the 13th of July 2020. Index theory simply identifies (1) with the schema.  
Kaplan argues that this approach is not correct. He noticed that Index theory 
takes into account only one dimension that is not enough to capture the difference 
between (1) and (2). According to Kaplan, (1) is just a sentence that if uttered, or 
just thought, could not be false. No matter who said (1) at whatever time they said 
it, he or she will always tell the truth. If (1) was identical to the schema we will have 
many false instances of it. But when (1) is expressed there are always speaker, time 
and place, so (1) is true for every context. It makes (1) a logical truth (at least for 
Kaplan). In contrast, there are many false instances of the schema ‘[at w] Agent a 
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is in place p at time t’. Therefore, Index theory fails to capture the real nature of 
(1).  
Furthermore, if (1) is treated as a logical truth, it becomes a counterexample 
to the principle of modal generalization (or ‘necessitation’):  
if ⊧φ then ⊧ □φ 
This principle says that every logical truth is also a necessary truth. Since (1) 
is a logical truth, (1) must be a necessary truth as well. But of course, it is contingent 
that I am in Tartu, at noon on the 13th of July. I could be in Russia, if there were 
no movement restrictions due to COVID-19 outbreak, or I could have been dead 
due to some contingent accident. There are many cases when (1) is expressing a 
contingent claim. Suppose that someone kidnapped me and put me in a car trunk. 
I would have no idea where am I and what time it will be at any moment but if I 
were to whisper ‘I am here now’ I would still be saying the truth. But it is 
completely contingent that I am here now. Thus, (1) is not only a logical truth but 
also a contingent truth.    
In my view, two of the motivations for Kaplan’s LD were the failure of the 
Index theory to explain why (1) is the logical truth and the rejection of the principle 
of modal generalization. Moreover, Kaplan realizes that Hans Kamp’s work on 
‘now’ where Kamp demonstrates that double indexing is required for dealing with 
temporal indexicals2 foreshadowed LD. Kaplan, therefore, came to the conclusion 
that we need double indexing to deal with indexicals. The first indexing is based 
on the context and the second is based on the circumstances of evaluation, which 
I will now go on to explain. 
The crucial role in LD is played by the difference between the content and 
the character. The content is “what is said” and traditionally been called a 
proposition. It is either true or false with respect to the circumstances of evaluation. 
Kaplan considers the content not only of sentences but also of definite descriptions, 
indexicals, predicates, etc In these cases, it finds an extension of a given expression. 
 
2 Kamp, H. (1971). Formal Properties of 'Now' 
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The content is an output of a function called the character. The character of an 
expression is set by linguistic conventions. It is fixed in case of sentences without 
any indexicals. But if a sentence contains an indexical expression then the 
character determines the content of it by filling the meaning of indexical with a 
relevant part of the context.    
According to Kaplan, when we encounter a sentence with an indexical 
expression, we go through a two-step process. First, we find the meaning of the 
indexical (or indexicals) from the context of utterance. This is done using the 
character of the expression, which is as a function from context to content.  For 
example, the character of ‘I’ will usually provide as an output the speaker of the 
context as a referent. In the second step of the process, we consider the content of 
a given sentence. The content will be a proposition and it is by using this 
proposition that we can determine a truth-value. As a result, we are able to say 
whether a sentence that contains an indexical(s) is true or false. 
Coming back to our original example, (2) has a fixed character and content. 
However, the content of (1) varies from one context to another, so its character 
isn’t a constant function. (2) “skips” the first step of the process above and goes 
directly to the true/false evaluation. However, the character of (1) means that we 
must first find out what proposition is expressed and only then we can evaluate the 
sentence. In this way, LD allows us to see the difference between (1) and (2).  
The LD system is defined in part XVIII “The Formal System” (Kaplan, 
1989:541-546). For now, I will only describe some key features of it. LD is based 
on first-order predicate logic with two sorts of variables, variables for positions 
and variables for individuals. It also includes modal operators for possibility ◊ and 
for necessity □, tense operators F (it will be the case), P (it has been the case that), 
G (one day ago, it was the case that), 1-place sentential operators N (now), A (it is 
actually the case), Y (yesterday, it has been the case), functor dthat, individual 
constant I and position constant Here.  
This formal system is enough to provide in addition to (1) some other 
examples of contingent a priori truths. Kaplan’s examples include  
11 
 
i. N (Located(I, Here)) (I am here now) 
ii.      Exists (I) (I exist) 
iii. φ↔ANφ (φ if and only if now it is actually the case that φ) 
iv. α=dthat[α]  
We have already seen why (i) is a contingent logical truth. (ii) is saying that 
our existence is contingent. Each of us could simply not be born or be born at some 
other time. The fact of our existence is contingent, according to Kaplan and LD. 
(iii) is a bit tricky. We know that ‘Tallinn is the capital of Estonia’. It is a contingent 
truth about the actual world. As it happens in the actual world then It is actually 
the case that Tallinn is the capital of Estonia. And as it happens now we can add N 
to get ‘It is actually the case that now Tallinn is the capital of Estonia’. We just saw 
that one part of biconditional is true. It seems to be obvious that if something is 
actually the case now then it is true. Thus, (iii) is a logical truth. But if φ is a 
contingent truth such as in case of the capital of Estonia then (iii) is not necessary.  
To understand the meaning of (iv) some extra explanation is required. 
dthat is a special functor that allows treating any description or singular term as 
directly referential. For example, ‘dthat [the author of this thesis]’ directly refers 
to me. Kaplan uses ‘dthat’ to solve Frege puzzle that is formulated in Kaplanian 
terms as follows (Kaplan, 1989:529): “How can ‘dthat[a]=dthat[b]’ if true, differ in 
cognitive significance from ‘dthat[a]=dthat[b]’?”. Continue with the previous 
example we can have the following instance of Frege puzzle: 
(D1) dthat [the author of this thesis]=dthat [Nikolai Shurakov]  
(D2) dthat [Nikolai Shurakov]=dthat[Nikolai Shurakov] 
Both (D1) and (D2) are true and have the same content; that is, both express 
an identity statement about me. Kaplan says that (D1) and (D2) have the same 
content but differ in the character. He identifies the character with the cognitive 
significance of thought. Then, (D1) and (D2) differ in character and we can see 
Kaplan’s solution of the Frege Puzzle. This solution is not so far from the Fregean 
original solution based on the distinction between the sense and the reference. 
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Back to the above example, (iv) might be illustrated by a famous example 
from Kripke3. Suppose that α is ‘one meter’.  
‘One meter’ = dthat (the length of S at time t0)  
‘One meter’ could rigidly refer to the length of the stick that was chosen to 
be a standard meter. As Kripke argues, the stick might be longer or shorter in some 
possible world due to some external factors like temperature. Hence, this sentence 
is a contingent a priori truth as well. As a result, we have even more arguments to 
agree with Kaplan that the principle of modal generalization is false.  
To sum up, LD is a two dimensional system with many operators that allows 
to deal with sentences which contain indexical expression(s). However, while we 
have so many operators in LD, we do not have any epistemic operators in this 
complex system. Is it possible to add one? This is the questions that I will attempt 
to answer. I will consider both standard and non-standard interpretations of the 




3 Kripke, S. (1980).  Naming and Necessity, pp.53-57. 
13 
 
2. LD and standard interpretation of the epistemic operator 
There is no need to emphasize the significance of knowledge in our life. But 
we usually think of knowledge as something that does not change through the 
passage of time. In contrast, the meaning of indexicals vary from one context to 
another. One might think that it is impossible to have a formal system such that 
combined both indexicals and knowledge. I argue that we can have such a system. 
We have already seen LD as a formal system to deal with indexicals. Epistemic 
logic is a formal way to deal with knowledge. A core of epistemic logic is the 
presence of an epistemic operator K (‘it is known that’). This operator can be 
further advanced by adding an agent who poses the knowledge but I am leaving it 
as a possibility for some later research. In this section, I introduce K to LD using 
it’s standard definition and argue that this combination does lead to some weird 
conclusions.  
Let’s see what will happen if we add an epistemic K-operator such that: 
Kχ is true at w, e, M iff for all u such that eRu, χ is true at w,u, M 
(χ is known in some epistemic possibility iff χ is true in every epistemic 
possibility relevantly accessible from e. M is used for a Model. By epistemic 
possibility I mean a possible world that may exist for all we know). 
This definition I am calling a standard definition because it is used widely as 
a starting point of a modal interpretation of knowledge4.  
The definition of an actuality operator A in LD is just: 
Aφ is true at w, v, M iff φ is true at w, w, M where w is the actual 
world   
(It means that a proposition that is said to be actually true is true in the world 
taken as an actual world). 
 
4 Sider, T. (2010). Logic for Philosophy, p.237; Rabinowicz, W. and Segerberg, K. (1994) use a similar 
definition and call it standard. 
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We know that φ↔Aφ is a logical truth in LD because it is a logical 
consequence of (iii)φ↔ANφ. So, we can put φ↔Aφ to the place of χ in the 
definition of K.  
K(φ↔Aφ) is true at w, e, M iff for all u such that eRu, φ↔Aφ is 
true at w,u, M 
By definition of K, it is known that φ↔Aφ if and only if for all epistemically 
accessible possible worlds φ↔Aφ is true. 
Then we consider a set of propositions about the actual world. Any 
proposition π is either actually true or its negation is actually true. φ↔Aφ allows 
us to omit the actuality condition and we can say that any proposition π or its 
negation is true for all epistemically possible worlds u. That’s why we can define ψ 
in the following way: 
ψ=π if π is true or ψ=¬π if ¬π is true  
As a result, we get the following: 
ψ=is true for all u such that eRu 
All possible interpretations of ψ are truths for all accessible u. This simply 
means by definition of knowledge operator that it is known that ψ. In other words, 
Kψ is the case. 
Consequently, we have (K+A) that summarizes what we observed so far:  
(K+A)                               K(φ↔Aφ) → (ψ→Kψ) 
We had no extra conditions on possible worlds w,e or u. It makes (K+A) to 
be valid in the system composed by LD and standard definition of K. In my view, 
(K+A) leads to some weird conclusions. 
The first surprising conclusion of (K+A) is that we must know all the truths. 
The only assumption about ψ was that it is true, and as a result, it is known. It 
reminds a conclusion similar to Fitch’s paradox of knowability inside the system: 
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if it is known that (φ↔Aφ), then everything is known. There are at least several 
problems I can deduct from this. 
Firstly, we need to know the content of ψ. Suppose that ψ is the statement 
by my great-( ... )-grandson about the weather on the 13th of July in 3020. He told 
the truth. If (K+A) is acceptable, then we already must know that ψ. But we have 
no idea of the content of this proposition. It is not true because of its form. It is not 
an instance of the law of excluded middle ψ∨¬ψ, for example. But somehow it must 
be known. In my opinion, it is a problem for a system. 
Secondly, (K+A) also leads to another kind of absurd conclusion. We know 
that φ↔Aφ. Suppose φ is a true contingent statement about the actual world, and 
we know that it is contingent. In that case, Aφ comes out as true in any world 
because it gets its truth-value from the actual world. Also, we know that Aφ→φ as 
a part of the biconditional that we know. From the knowledge of contingency, we 
can think about a possible world u such that φ is not the case in u. Aφ and Aφ→φ 
are true in u. By Modus Ponens, we must know that φ is the case in u. As a result, 
we get a proposition of the same kind as a claim about Schrödinger’s cat: we know 
that φ in u, and we know that φ is not the case in u. 
Furthermore, we will be in a more troublesome situation if we add an 
epistemic agent and want to interpret K as ‘it is known for an agent a that’. Any 
(under)graduate philosophy student know that φ↔Aφ (for example, after reading 
Demonstratives). One of these students knows that φ↔Aφ.  Thus, the antecedent 
of (K+A) is true for her, and she can come to the conclusion that if there exists 
some truth ψ then it must be known by her - Kψ. She is omniscient. As a result, 
any such a student must know everything. It might be such a wonderful world to 
live in if just one book provides you with a key to omniscience. But it is obviously 
not the case in the actual world. 
We have combined the standard interpretation of K with just φ↔Aφ, but we 
could do the same using φ↔ANφ. It would lead to even more implausible claims 
about our current state of affairs. For example, we know that φ↔ANφ, and 
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therefore, we know everything now even the truth-value of something said by my 
great-( ... )-grandson in 3020. That is an unwanted result.  
To sum up, adding K-operator to LD generates several problems. First is that 
we must know the truth-value of any proposition, even those proposition that are 
completely unknown to us right now or even potentially always unknown to us. 
The second is that a combination of K-operator and theorem φ↔Aφ results in a 
paradoxical statement that we know and don’t know some φ simultaneously. We 
also might face difficulty trying to add an agential or a temporal aspect in our 
reasoning. Therefore, I argue that LD is inconsistent with the given standard 
interpretation of epistemic operator K. 
I think that this problem is caused by the lack of discrimination between 
epistemically accessible possible worlds and between metaphysically accessible 
worlds. The actuality operator A depends on the world that is taken as an actual. If 
it is actually the case that ψ in the actual world then Aψ is true in any other 
metaphysically possible world i.e. in any possibility that is “allowed by the natures 
of all of the things that could have existed”5. The set of epistemic possibilities is 
narrower. Hence, not every metaphysical possibility is also an epistemic possibility. 
It might be the case that something is actually true but we do not know it. Therefore, 
we cannot access some epistemic possibility based on this unknown truth. At the 
same time, (iii)φ↔ANφ allows us to push through any metaphysically possible 
truth to the scope of the epistemic operator K. It makes the unknown actual truth 
to be true for all epistemically accessible worlds that means that it becomes known. 
To avoid this contradiction, we need to differentiate the scopes of actuality 
operator A and epistemic operator K. In the next section, I will present an 








3. How to add the epistemic operator to LD? 
We noticed that we had troubles because we did not distinguish between 
epistemic and metaphysical possibilities. Consequently, we should try to find a 
semantics that makes this distinction. To do this, we will be using resources found 
with the work done by Rabinowicz and Segerberg in “Actual Truth, Possible 
Knowledge”. 
In their article, they are focused on trying to avoid Fitch’s paradox, which 
was similar to one of the problems we faced dealing with the standard 
interpretations of the epistemic operator. Their starting point is Edington’s 
formulation of verificationism i.e. an idea that truth implies knowability. 
Edgington (1985) provided a formulation of a verificationist claim that seems to 
be good enough to avoid Fitch paradox: 
Aψ → ◊KAψ6   
It means that it is possible to know the actual truths. If something is true in 
the actual world, then it is possible to know it. But it does not mean omniscience 
because something might actually be the case but be unknown. It is conceivable 
that something happened but nobody noticed it and the claim about this event is 
unknown. Edington’s formulation of verificationism is consistent with such cases. 
The Fitch paradox does not arise. 
However, Rabinowich and Segerberg decided to combine Edington’s 
formulation of verificationism with standard interpretations of necessity operator 
☐ and epistemic operator K. It resulted in the claim (Rabinowich and Segerberg, 
1994:104): “[W]hatever happens to be true is known to be actually true.”  
It is almost the same claim as a consequent of (K+A). In that way, 
Rabinowicz and Segerberg faced the same problem of combining the actuality 
operator with the epistemic operator.  
 
6 Edgington, D. (1985). The Paradox of Knowability, p. 567;  Rabinowicz, W. and Segerberg, K. (1994). 
Actual truth, possible knowledge, p.102.  
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To solve the problem, they introduce another interpretation for K-operator. 
They take a two-dimensional logic, but they call the first dimension -  perspective 
(or point of perspective), and another dimension is called reference world.  
If we try to combine it with Kaplan’s LD, then we should treat dimensions in 
the following way: the reference world is a world of evaluation (circumstances of 
evaluation), and a variable perspective is just a Kaplanian context. In my view, this 
interpretation is not far from Kaplan’s original intentions about double indexing 
in circumstances of evaluation and the context. The key difference is that the 
modal operators are classified as fixed perspective (necessity operator ☐ and 
actuality operator A) or as a variable-perspective operator (epistemic operator K). 
In the case of epistemic possibilities, we can have not only different contexts but 
also different circumstances of evaluation (in Kaplanian terms). Suppose that 
some event EVENT has happened in the actual world. Hence, it is true that the 
event has happened. In the case of actuality operator, we have a fixed perspective 
and when we look at the circumstances of evaluation we can only get that 
A(EVENT) is true. However, there are different options with respect to epistemic 
context. It is possible that EVENT has happened but no one knows about it. We 
have two varieties of circumstances of evaluation - the first is such that K(EVENT) 
[it is known that event has happened] and the second is such that ¬K(EVENT) [it 
is not known that event has happened]. The variable-perspective provides these 
options.  
Then, let’s try to combine  LD and the approach defended by Rabinowicz and 
Segerberg, the interpretation of the epistemic operator is (Rabinowicz and 
Segerberg, 1994:105): 
Kφ at w,v, M iff ‘φ’ is true at every w’ and v’ such that <w,v> 
E<w’,v’> 
where E is a special epistemic relation between the states. As we know, 
Rabinowicz and Segerberg differentiate between fixed-perspective and variable-
perspective. To allow the variation in perspective they introduce E-relation that 
plays a crucial role in the definition of the epistemic operator. As we have a two-
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dimensional system we have two sources of epistemic uncertainty - two worlds. 
That’s why we have both w’ and v’ in the definition of K. Moreover, E is not a 
relation between worlds but between states. Rabinowicz and Segerberg define 
states as ordered pairs of world. States in which reference and perspective worlds 
coincide (ordered pair <w,w> is an example) called self-centered. So, we have a set 
of states that includes a set of self-centered states. With respect to these sets, 
Rabinowicz and Segerberg define two types of validity in this system7: 
φ is weakly valid if and only if φ is true in any state u such that u 
is self-centered 
φ is strongly valid if and only if φ is true in any state u 
What will happen with (K+A) if we add K to LD using the definition of K 
given above?  
K(φ↔Aφ) → (ψ→Kψ) must be true with respect to <w,w> E<w’,w’> to be 
weakly valid. However, the move φ→Kφ is problematic because E allows different 
perspectives. It might be the case that φ is true but there are different perspectives 
w and w’ such that φ is or isn’t known for w and w’ respectively.  
I will illustrate it with an example. Suppose, I say ‘There are two books on 
my table’. It could be more or fewer books in some other possible worlds but there 
are just two in the actual world. Epistemic operator K is variable-perspective 
operator, so there are at least two perspectives from which we know or don’t know 
that there are two books on my table. Metaphorically speaking, if you are in my 
room there is a perspective which allows you to verify my claim, and if you are not 
in Tartu then your perspective does not allow you to know whether I have a couple 
of books on my table or not. These different perspectives are simply w and w’. As 
a result, any case of contingent truth ψ will be similar to my example: ψ is true at 
w but might be false at w’. There might be a perspective such that ψ is true but it is 
not known that ψ - ¬ Kψ. Hence, there are cases when Kψ. is not implied by ψ. 
Therefore, (K+A) might have true antecedents but false consequent. That means it 
 




cannot be weakly valid. As it is not valid for self-centered states it cannot be valid 
for all states. Therefore, (K+A) is not strongly valid as well. If so, (K+A) is not able 
to cause the problems from the second section, and we can combine LD with the 
ideas of Rabinowicz and Segerberg.  
To conclude, I claim that LD might be expanded by adding epistemic 
operator K using Rabinowicz and Segerberg’s approach. Their interpretation of 
two-dimensions, I think, is in accord with the spirit of Kaplan. Two-dimensional 
interpretation for K might be directly introduced to LD. Let’s call this logic The 
Logic of Knowledge and Demonstratives (or simply LD+K).   
This logic will be capable with processing sentences like ‘It is known that I 
am here now’. The first step is taking the meaning from the context of utterance to 
get a proposition. Then, this proposition is to be evaluated with respect to 
epistemic possibilities. This sentence could not be proceeded by the original 
system LD but could be proceeded by LD+K. It is the small but improvement of 
the method we had. Maybe, it is some step towards the progress in philosophy. 






My thesis aims to demonstrate how an epistemic operator K can be added to 
the Logic of Demonstratives. I started with a description of Kaplan’s LD. Firstly, I 
showed that Index Theory was not good enough to capture an idea that ‘I am here 
now’ is a logical truth. Secondly, if ‘I am here now’ is a logical truth then the 
principle of modal generalization (that states that all logical truths are necessary) 
is false. Indeed, it is usually contingent that I am here now. In my view, these two 
reasons motivated Kaplan to create the formal system LD. There are several 
contingent logical truths in LD but one of them φ↔Aφ  played a crucial role in my 
further reasoning. 
In the second section of the thesis, I tried to add the epistemic operator K to 
the LD using its standard definition. As a result, I got a formula (K+A) that, in my 
opinion, leads to a number of weird results. If it is known that φ↔Aφ  then every 
truth is known. This problem reminded me of the Fitch paradox of knowability. 
That’s why I was looking for an interpretation of epistemic operator that avoids 
this paradox. 
I found an article of Rabinowicz and Segerberg(1994) that provides the non-
standard interpretation of epistemic operator K. They consider necessity and 
actuality operators as ones with a fixed perspective and allow K to have a variable 
perspective. As a result, their definition of K might be directly added to LD without 
creating the troublesome formula (K+A). It helps to avoid all the problems from 
the second section. In addition, Rabinowicz and Segerberg deal with the two-
dimensional system as well and the pair of dimensions they use can be identified 
with the pair of dimensions used by Kaplan. That’s why I conclude that we can 
have the Logic for Knowledge and demonstratives (LD+K) and treat it like a 
possible extension of LD. 
This conclusion equips us with a formal tool to analyze sentences like ‘It is 
known that I am here now’ that was unanalyzable in the original formal system. 
Doing something that we were not able to do in the past is a step towards progress 
in the philosophy of language. In this way, my thesis contributes to the 
development of philosophical methodology we have.  
However, the thesis creates a room for some future research. I was dealing 
only with epistemic operator K and its interpretation as ‘It is known that’ but there 
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are several ways to improve my result. For example, we may add an agent who 
knows something and interpret K as ‘It is known for an agent a that’. Another way 
for future research is an opportunity to introduce some epistemic (and not only 
epistemic) operators. We may add an operator B ‘it is believed that’ or try to add 
some other. Anyway, this thesis makes a contribution to the theoretical philosophy 
either as some methodological improvement or as a base for some further research.  
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The thesis aims to demonstrate how an epistemic operator K can be added 
to the Logic of Demonstratives. I started with a description of Kaplan’s LD. First 
off, I showed two reasons motivated Kaplan to create the formal system LD. There 
are several contingent logical truths in LD but one of them φ↔Aφ  played a crucial 
role in my further reasoning. In the second section of the thesis, I tried to add the 
epistemic operator K to the LD using its standard definition. As a result, I got a 
formula (K+A) that leads to a number of weird results. For example, If it is known 
that φ↔Aφ  then every truth is known. I argue that LD is inconsistent with the 
standard interpretation for K. However, Rabinowicz and Segerberg(1994)  provide 
the non-standard interpretation of epistemic operator K. They consider necessity 
and actuality operators as ones with a fixed perspective and allow K to have a 
variable perspective. As a result, their definition of K might be directly added to 
LD without creating the troublesome formula (K+A). It helps to avoid all the 
problems from the second section That’s why I conclude that we can have the Logic 
for Knowledge and demonstratives (LD+K) and treat it like a possible extension 
of LD. This conclusion equips us with a formal tool to analyze sentences like ‘It is 
known that I am here now’ that was unanalyzable in the original formal system 
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